My own opinion is trapped between two erudite and insightful commentators. May I suggest that Russia's goals for SMO have never changed nor wavered. Yet in the past, Russia was more willing to play along with the nonsensical US "peace efforts" and more willing to say "we can discuss". Beginning from the second Oreshnik strike, that soft smile is gone. As for the military operations on the ground, it is more of Russia's "Deep War" getting into a higher tempo as the attrition effect becomes obvious, and not so much of "we have a harder line now". Maybe I can say that Putin's expectation of how the West will continue this conflict has changed, at least the extent of how much nonsense can be tolerated MAY have changed. But from Russia's point of view, the end-game requirement has not changed. So the line has always been there, but the elasticity is likely less.
The Russians are strong believers in Clausewitz's idea that war is the continuation of politics by other means.
In other words, success on the battlefield leads to new political objectives. For example, the March 2022 Istanbul peace talks included a demand for neutrality in addition to conditions set out in the Minsk II peace accord.
The West having rejected the Istanbul peace process, now faces additional Russian demands for a broader security architecture, neither included in the Istanbul peace agreement nor the Minsk II accords.
Thus, the more the Russians advance on the battle field, the greater their political demands.
Sounds like a storm in a teacup tbh. Don't recall anyone saying dissident analysts HAVE to agree to the smallest detail.
Your agreement or not isn't going to affect the Kremlin's choice of actions either.
As to the details of the niggle, with total collapse of the Kiev so close, and Odessa within visible reach, personally if *I* was in the Kremlin I'd play hardball too until that prize is certainly obtained. The West would never give an inch if the boot was on the other foot.
After up to 200,000 Russian KIAs, to stop before a certain defensive position was reached would be to sell that enormous sacrifice - especially with the US signalling the UN and International Law is OVER, and the 'Law of the Jungle' is back.
Putin does not wish to end his illustrious career, as a Gorbachev in history.
If there is a small loss of 'international prestige' from playing hardball FOR ONCE, then so be it.
Russia will continue to be demonised in the West even if Russia just unexpectedly surrendered.
Blandishments from the West should be treated with the same disdain as the threats were.
For at least four years now, hell, arguably going back to 2014, we've been hearing that Russia is finally taking the gloves off, they're serious this time, no really, they're serious!
This nuanced take on the Putin-Mercouris debate is exactly what we need right now. Your distinction between intent and implemented policy is spot-on—dunno if Western analysts grasp how much daylight can exist between what's planned and what actually materializes in Russian diplomacy. The ambiguity itself might be doing work here, keeping options open while signaling without commiting. Once saw similar tactical vagueness during the Minsk negotiations, and it bought Moscow alot of operational flexibility.
My own opinion is trapped between two erudite and insightful commentators. May I suggest that Russia's goals for SMO have never changed nor wavered. Yet in the past, Russia was more willing to play along with the nonsensical US "peace efforts" and more willing to say "we can discuss". Beginning from the second Oreshnik strike, that soft smile is gone. As for the military operations on the ground, it is more of Russia's "Deep War" getting into a higher tempo as the attrition effect becomes obvious, and not so much of "we have a harder line now". Maybe I can say that Putin's expectation of how the West will continue this conflict has changed, at least the extent of how much nonsense can be tolerated MAY have changed. But from Russia's point of view, the end-game requirement has not changed. So the line has always been there, but the elasticity is likely less.
The Russians are strong believers in Clausewitz's idea that war is the continuation of politics by other means.
In other words, success on the battlefield leads to new political objectives. For example, the March 2022 Istanbul peace talks included a demand for neutrality in addition to conditions set out in the Minsk II peace accord.
The West having rejected the Istanbul peace process, now faces additional Russian demands for a broader security architecture, neither included in the Istanbul peace agreement nor the Minsk II accords.
Thus, the more the Russians advance on the battle field, the greater their political demands.
Sounds like a storm in a teacup tbh. Don't recall anyone saying dissident analysts HAVE to agree to the smallest detail.
Your agreement or not isn't going to affect the Kremlin's choice of actions either.
As to the details of the niggle, with total collapse of the Kiev so close, and Odessa within visible reach, personally if *I* was in the Kremlin I'd play hardball too until that prize is certainly obtained. The West would never give an inch if the boot was on the other foot.
After up to 200,000 Russian KIAs, to stop before a certain defensive position was reached would be to sell that enormous sacrifice - especially with the US signalling the UN and International Law is OVER, and the 'Law of the Jungle' is back.
Putin does not wish to end his illustrious career, as a Gorbachev in history.
If there is a small loss of 'international prestige' from playing hardball FOR ONCE, then so be it.
Russia will continue to be demonised in the West even if Russia just unexpectedly surrendered.
Blandishments from the West should be treated with the same disdain as the threats were.
For at least four years now, hell, arguably going back to 2014, we've been hearing that Russia is finally taking the gloves off, they're serious this time, no really, they're serious!
This nuanced take on the Putin-Mercouris debate is exactly what we need right now. Your distinction between intent and implemented policy is spot-on—dunno if Western analysts grasp how much daylight can exist between what's planned and what actually materializes in Russian diplomacy. The ambiguity itself might be doing work here, keeping options open while signaling without commiting. Once saw similar tactical vagueness during the Minsk negotiations, and it bought Moscow alot of operational flexibility.